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Abstract
Co-speech gestures have been proposed to strengthen sensorimotor knowledge related to objects’ weight and manipulability.
This pre-registered study (https://www.osf.io/9uh6q/) was designed to explore how gestures affect memory for sensorimotor
information through the application of the visual-haptic size-weight illusion (i.e., objects weigh the same, but are experienced as different in weight). With this paradigm, a discrepancy can be induced between participants’ conscious illusory
perception of objects’ weight and their implicit sensorimotor knowledge (i.e., veridical motor coordination). Depending on
whether gestures reflect and strengthen either of these types of knowledge, gestures may respectively decrease or increase
the magnitude of the size-weight illusion. Participants (N = 159) practiced a problem-solving task with small and large
objects that were designed to induce a size-weight illusion, and then explained the task with or without co-speech gesture
or completed a control task. Afterwards, participants judged the heaviness of objects from memory and then while holding
them. Confirmatory analyses revealed an inverted size-weight illusion based on heaviness judgments from memory and we
found gesturing did not affect judgments. However, exploratory analyses showed reliable correlations between participants’
heaviness judgments from memory and (a) the number of gestures produced that simulated actions, and (b) the kinematics of
the lifting phases of those gestures. These findings suggest that gestures emerge as sensorimotor imaginings that are governed
by the agent’s conscious renderings about the actions they describe, rather than implicit motor routines.
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Sensorimotor knowledge from the previous interactions with
the environment plays an important role in planning and
predicting everyday actions. For example, imagining object
rotations is aided by hand gestures that simulate the manipulation of those objects (Chu & Kita, 2011; see also Alibali,
Spencer, Knox, & Kita, 2011; Boncoddo, Dixon, & Kelly,
2010). It has been suggested that, by recruiting sensorimotor
routines, remembered information of the previous interactions with objects becomes available that can support the
predictability of the environment (Hostetter & Boncoddo,
2017; Pouw & Hostetter, 2016). Relevant to the present
study, it has been found that gestures can also strengthen
sensorimotor information in memory, which makes the
information about object manipulation more prominent, and
affects subsequent action on objects (e.g., Goldin-Meadow
& Beilock, 2010). In the current study, we test this sensorimotor strengthening effect by exploring how co-speech
hand gestures affect memory for sensorimotor information
through the application of a well-known visual-haptic illusion known as the size-weight illusion.
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The size-weight illusion (SWI) occurs when participants
perceive a difference in the heaviness when lifting two differently sized objects that are, in fact, the same weight (i.e.,
haptic perception; for a review, see Buckingham, 2014).
Specifically, a smaller object is experienced to be heavier
than a larger object with the same weight. The exact mechanisms of the SWI are still under debate and may relate to
the veridical perception of wieldability of an object (e.g.,
Amazeen & Turvey, 1996; Zhu & Bingham, 2011) and/or
top–down expectations that small objects should be lighter
than larger objects leading to expectation errors that bias
experience (see Buckingham, 2014). The SWI is so robust
that it persists even when participants have been told that the
objects are the same weight and have been allowed to lift the
objects with their eyes closed and feel the equivalent weight
(Buckingham, 2014). The SWI is also present on the motor
level, as it initially affects the gripping strength participants
use to lift objects (Flanagan & Beltzner, 2000).
However, despite the persistence of the consciously experienced illusion, participants’ motor coordination eventually
attunes to the lack of difference in weights after interacting with the objects multiple times. After lifting the objects
20 times, participants no longer overestimate the strength
needed to lift a smaller object relative to a larger object (Flanagan & Beltzner, 2000). It appears that the perceptuo-motor
system comes to attune to the veridical sensory feedback
from lifting the objects, even while the conscious experience that the smaller object is heavier than the larger object
remains unaltered. Therefore, after repeatedly (> 20 times)
lifting the objects, there seems to be a disconnect in the
sensorimotor knowledge available to the motor system as it
plans a hand-grasp and the sensorimotor knowledge that is
consciously available to the participant. This disassociation
between implicit motor knowledge and explicit conscious
knowledge has been explained by the different functional
roles of the dorsal and ventral neural pathways (see Goodale
& Milner, 1992). Importantly, because implicit motor knowledge and explicit knowledge diverge, the SWI is an interesting phenomenon for understanding how gestures might
strengthen different kinds of sensorimotor knowledge.
Gestures differ from real actions, because they do not
involve objects, and they differ from pantomimes, because
they accompany speech. There is some evidence suggesting that gestures can affect how speakers think about the
weight of the objects which they describe (Beilock &
Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Cooperrider, Wakefield, & Goldin-Meadow, 2015; Trofatter, Kontra, Beilock, & GoldinMeadow, 2015). Beilock and Goldin-Meadow (2010) had
participants solve the Tower of Hanoi (TOH) task, in which
participants manipulate discs of different sizes and corresponding weights according to specific rules. After solving
the task, some participants were asked to explain how they
solved the task and to use gestures as they did so. Then,
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all participants were asked to solve the task a second time
in one of two conditions. In the No Switch condition, the
second task was physically identical to the previous task.
In the Switch condition, the discs’ weights were switched,
so that the smallest disc was now the heaviest and could no
longer be lifted with one hand. Beilock and Goldin-Meadow
(2010) showed that the more participants gestured about lifting the smallest disc with one hand, the more impaired they
were on the second version of the task when the weights had
been switched. The basic effect has been replicated several
times with similar methodological procedures and sample
sizes (Cooperrider et al., 2015; Trofatter et al., 2015; but see
Wassenburg, de Koning, & van der Schoot, 2018 for contrasting evidence), and the general explanation provided for
it is that “using gesture to describe physical interactions with
the environment generates strong mental representations that
involve physical properties of the action and/or the environment (properties like weight)” (Trofatter et al., 2015, p. 8).
If this explanation is extended to gestures about objects
that induce an SWI, participants’ memories for the weights
of the objects should be affected by whether they gestured
about lifting them. This could be manifest in either of two
ways, depending on the nature of the sensorimotor knowledge that gestures strengthen (Flanagan & Beltzner, 2000).
On one hand, gestures may bring the conscious perception
of the objects’ weights more in line with the sensorimotor
knowledge that is available to the motor system as participants actually lift the objects. For example, there is evidence
that manual pantomimes (i.e., enactment of an interaction
without a present object) approximate the kinematics of normal grasping actions to a high degree (Weiss, Jeannerod,
Paulignan, & Freund, 2000) and that they simulate actionspecific knowledge such as weight (Ansuini et al., 2016).
Furthermore, some evidence suggests that gestures can
help problem solvers to gain conscious awareness of their
implicit knowledge (e.g., Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986;
Perry, Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988). Under this view,
gesturing about lifting the objects repeatedly may align participants’ conscious perception of the weights of the objects
more closely with the sensorimotor knowledge which they
possess about how to actually lift them. This would result in
a smaller SWI after gesturing about lifting the objects than
after not gesturing.
On the other hand, it is also possible that gesturing about
lifting the objects could strengthen the size of the illusion.
Under this view, gesturing about lifting the objects could
reflect and strengthen participants’ memory of the conscious
perception that the smaller object is heavier, rather than
their sensorimotor knowledge about how to actually lift the
objects that are of the same weight. Pantomimes appear to be
coordinated by a system concerned with perceptual aspects
of objects rather than implicit action-specific (motor-relevant) properties of objects (Goodale, Jakobson, & Keillor,
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1994). For example, when participants are asked to pantomime grasping a previously seen stick—that is designed
to induce a visual illusion (i.e., Müller-Lyer illusion)—the
hand aperture is biased by their illusory perception of the
stick length. In contrast, when participants reach to grasp
the actual sticks, the kinematics of their hand aperture do
not reflect this illusory perception to similar degress and
are, instead, more attuned to the actual lengths of the sticks
(Westwood, Heath, & Roy, 2000). Thus, it is possible that
gesturing about lifting the objects will further cement the
illusory rendering that the smaller object is heavier in weight
than the larger object.
In the present study, we test these possibilities by first
having all participants practice solving a problem with
pieces that induce a size-weight illusion. The problem
involved physically moving the pieces 30 times, which is
enough lifting experience with the pieces for the perceptuomotor system to attune to the equal weights of the objects.
Thus, at the end of the problem-solving task (see “Methods”
for details), all participants were assumed to have accurate
implicit sensorimotor knowledge that the weights of the
pieces were equal while still experiencing an illusory conscious experience that the smaller object is heavier than the
larger object (Flanagan & Beltzner, 2000). Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In
the Control condition, participants performed a non-related
task (i.e., solving a Sudoku puzzle). In the Gesture condition, participants were asked to explain the solution of the
problem-solving task while gesturing. In the No-Gesture
condition, participants were asked to sit on their hands while
explaining the problem solution. It should be noted that, in
gesture research, it is difficult to find a no-gesture explaining condition without confounding variables. On one hand,
research has shown that prohibiting gestures can negatively
affect the semantic richness of explanations (e.g., Hostetter,
Alibali, & Kita, 2007). On the other hand, it is difficult to
find participants who do not gesture spontaneously (e.g.,
Eielts et al., 2018) when explaining tasks involving spatial
and motor skills, and such participants may have different
spatial and motor skills than participants who do use cospeech gestures. In the present study, a prohibiting gesture
condition was included to rule out an effect of explaining
in and of it. Importantly, we did not expect semantic richness of verbal explanations to influence the SWI as the previous studies have shown no effects of gesture on speech
content in this type of problem-solving task (e.g., Beilock
& Goldin-Meadow, 2010). Similar exploratory analyses of
speech content are included in the present paper to verify
this (for results see Analysis 5 in “Appendix 2”). Finally, all
participants provided two estimates of how heavy the taskrelevant pieces felt using a magnitude estimation procedure
commonly used to ascertain the magnitude of the SWI (e.g.,
Buckingham, Goodale, White, & Westwood, 2016). They

were first asked to recall heaviness from memory (i.e., main
variable of interest) and subsequently provided an estimate
while holding the objects (i.e., this more direct estimate of
the SWI serves as a materials check). Participants who experience the SWI should report the small cube as being heavier than the large cube in both measures. Furthermore, we
predicted that the magnitude of the experienced SWI (i.e.,
recalled heaviness) might depend on whether participants
had gestured about the task. Compared to participants who
have not gestured about lifting the objects, participants who
have gestured about lifting the objects should experience
either a larger SWI (if gestures strengthen the consciously
perceived illusion that the smaller object is heavier) or a
smaller SWI (if gestures allow access to implicit sensorimotor knowledge about actual lifting).
In addition to these pre-registered hypotheses (https://
www.osf.io/9uh6q/), we conducted a series of exploratory
analyses pertaining to how gestures are related to specific
aspects of sensorimotor knowledge. In a recent conceptual
replication of the original TOH studies, researchers failed
to obtain the original sensorimotor strengthening effect
(Wassenburg et al., 2018). However, they did find that
task-relevant gestures (i.e., movements from left-to-right)
were related to relatively slower task performance in the
switched condition (solving TOH from right to left), similar to the correlation between amount of one-handed movements and task solution reported by Beilock and GoldinMeadow (2010) in the Switch condition. These results may
be explained by the hypothesis that gestures reflect (rather
than affect) the way that participants think about the task. In
the present study, we addressed this hypothesis by examining how gesture form is related to the magnitude of either
the recalled or the perceived illusion. We examined how
often gestures were produced that closely mirrored the lifting motion involved in the actual task (e.g., lifting with two
hands, rather than one), to see if producing such congruent
gestures would be associated with a larger or smaller illusion. We also used a Frame Differencing Method (FDM;
Brookshire, Lu, Nusbaum, Goldin-Meadow, & Cassasanto,
2017; Romero et al., 2017; Pouw et al., 2018) to measure the
velocity of two-handed lifting gestures to explore whether
participants who report that the objects are heavier would
move their hands more slowly as they gestured about lifting
them. If gestures reflect such sensorimotor knowledge in
their kinematics, this would provide strong evidence that
gestures are based in sensorimotor know how.
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As stated in the pre-registration, data collection was continued until there were 53 participants per condition.

Materials

Fig. 1  Cube pairs (six identical sets). (Color figure online)

Method
Participants
This study was conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the ethical committee of the Department of Psychology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. As stated in the
pre-registration (https://www.osf.io/9uh6q/), participants
(N = 162, N − exclusions = 159) were recruited from a Dutch
University for course credit or a small monetary reward. All
participants provided informed consent prior to their inclusion in the study. The sample was largely female (73.6%),
right-handed (86.7%), and had a mean age of 20.78 years
(SD = 2.79, range 18–38). Gender (χ2 = 2.06, p = .357) and
hand dominance (χ2 = 5.82, p = .444) ratios were equal
across conditions. The sample size was based on G*Power
calculations for a between-subjects design with three groups:
a medium-effect size (Cohen’s F = 0.25), a power of 80%,
and an alpha of 5% (see Appendix C of the pre-registration
for G*Power calculation specifications). Note that three participants were excluded from the data set. One participant
did not understand the instructions and technical problems
resulted in the loss of video data from two other participants.

Problem-solving task We used a physical version of the Frog
Leap computer task (e.g., van Gog, 2011), which requires
the transformation of a begin state into a goal state given
specific rules. In our version of the task, participants moved
pairs of cubes that each consisted of one large and one small
cube (see Fig. 1). The goal is to move the pairs on the right
side to the left, and the pairs on the left side to the right, by
lifting both cubes in a pair simultaneously to “jump” them
over another pair. A pair of cubes could only be placed on an
empty designated spot (indicated by blue laminated ovals).
Participants moved one pair at a time by lifting both cubes
in the pair by their handles. Pairs could be moved only one
step forward and backward moves were not permitted. A pair
from one side was allowed to jump over one pair from the
opposite side (and vice versa). Participants transformed the
task from begin state to end state (see Fig. 2), and again from
end state to begin state, which took 30 moves to complete.
Cubes Participants were presented with six identical pairs of cubes (see Figs. 1, 2). Each cube pair consisted of a small (7 cm × 7 cm × 7 cm) and a large cube
(10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm) that had been filled with finegrained sand to weigh exactly 450 g. This resulted in a density ratio between the small and large cubes of approximately
3:1 (i.e., 1.31 g/cm3 for small cubes and 0.45 g/cm3 for large
cubes). The previous research has shown that although equal
in weight, a difference of 2.1 cm3 in size will result in a
reliable size-weight illusion; a smaller cube of 7.4 cm3 was
experienced to be about 20% heavier than the equally heavy
but larger cube of 9.3 cm3 (i.e., with a density ratio of 2:1;
Buckingham et al., 2016). All cubes were wrapped in silver–gray duct tape and marked with either two “x” or two
“y” symbols to distinguish whether it began on the left side
or right side. A handle was affixed to the top of each cube.

Fig. 2  Schematic representation of the task set-up of the adapted Frog Leap task. Upper picture shows begin state; lower picture shows the target
state. (Color figure online)
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Camera All participants were tested in a lab with a builtin video camera at the approximate eye height of a seated
person. Participants were seated directly in front (i.e., 0°
angle) of the camera at a distance of 280 cm. Care was taken
to keep the seating position relative to the camera identical
across participants to allow for exploratory analyses on the
kinematics of gesture (e.g., Hilliard & Cook, 2017).
Heaviness ratings Heaviness of the small cube and the
large cube was measured on a ten-point scale running from
1 = ‘very light object’ to 10 = ‘very heavy object’ using the
question “How heavy did you perceive the [small or large]
cube to be?”. A visual representation of the heaviness scale
was presented, and participants provided verbal responses.
The difference between the two heaviness ratings for large
and small cubes indicates the magnitude of the size-weight
illusion (i.e., heaviness small cube > heaviness large cube).
This is a common method to measure the size-weight illusion when a single heaviness rating per cube is used (e.g.,
Buckingham et al., 2016). Note that the order of heaviness
ratings for the small and large cubes was counterbalanced.

Design
The study followed a 2 × 2 × 3 mixed design with size (small
cube vs. large cube) as a within-subjects factor, and order
(small–large vs. large–small order of heaviness ratings) and
condition (Gesture Condition vs. No-Gesture Condition vs.
Control Condition) as between-subjects factors. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.
Participants who were asked to explain the task were either
encouraged to use their hands (Gesture Condition) or were
prohibited from using their hands (No-Gesture Condition).
Participants who did not explain the task solved a Sudoku
puzzle instead (Control Condition). The main outcome variable was Recalled Heaviness (from memory). An additional
outcome variable, Perceived Heaviness, was added to check
whether the materials were appropriate to induce a sizeweight illusion.1

Procedure
Participants were instructed that they would learn to solve
a game puzzle. First, participants were given an instruction
sheet containing the rules and goal of the game (“Appendix 1” of the pre-registration). After indicating that they

1
This additional measure was added after realizing the experiment
should include a material check (with the same participants) to see
if the materials would induce a size-weight illusion under normal
conditions (i.e., perceived heaviness while lifting two cubes of different sizes at the same time). At this point, 21 participants had already
been tested and, therefore, we only have perceived heaviness ratings
while holding the cubes from the remaining 138 participants.

understood the rules, they completed a scripted problemsolving routine of the task (“Appendix 2” of the pre-registration; practice phase), containing 15 steps to solve the
puzzle once and 15 steps to solve the puzzle another time,
but in the opposite direction (i.e., the end state was the begin
state and vice versa). This way, the positions of cubes were
perfectly counterbalanced within participants (i.e., all participants lifted both small and large cubes with both left and
right hands and moved them to the left vs. right an equal
number of times). Solving the puzzle twice also ensured
that all participants used 30 lifting trials as they practiced
the puzzle. We required 30 lifting trials to achieve the state
demonstrated in the previous research where participants no
longer produce higher gripping forces for the smaller cube
(i.e., the unconscious motor knowledge has attuned to actual
weight of the cubes), but, nevertheless, still experience a
conscious size-weight illusion (Flanagan & Beltzner, 2000).
Participants were instructed that there was no time constraint and that it was important that they worked as accurately as possible. If the participant did make a mistake, the
experimenter intervened by placing the misplaced pieces
back and performing the right step instead. Only 12 participants made one or two mistakes (control condition n = 4,
gesture condition n = 3, and no-gesture condition n = 5).
Importantly, the experimenter did not pick up the pieces, but
moved the pieces by sliding the placeholders. This ensured
that participants did not derive weight information from
observing actions of the experimenter. The total time spent
on the task was noted by the experimenter.
After the practice phase, the puzzle task was removed
from the participant’s sight for the rest of the experiment.
In the control condition, participants solved a Sudoku puzzle for 2 min. In the explanation conditions, the table was
moved away to ensure that participants had a full motion
range fully visible to the camera. Participants were asked
to explain the 15 solution steps of the task, as though talking to someone who was familiar with the rules, but not the
solution of the puzzle. To equate the amount of time spent
explaining with the time spent in the control task, participants were instructed to stop explaining after 2 min, though
this time requirement time was not mentioned to participants before their explanation. Half of the participants in
the explanation conditions were instructed to use their hands
while explaining the steps (gesture condition), whereas the
other half were asked to put their hands under their legs to
prevent them from using them (no-gesture condition). In line
with the previous gesturing studies (e.g., Beilock & GoldinMeadow, 2010), we explicitly asked participants to (not) use
their hands. In both conditions, if the participants were silent
for 10 s or if they lost track of the imagined solution steps,
they were instructed to try again and start with the first step.
These prompts were repeated if necessary to ensure that the
full 2 min were used for active explanation.
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Fig. 3  Example of deictic, one-handed, and two-handed grasp/move gestures

After 2 min of explaining or solving the Sudoku, participants were given a visual representation of the ten-point
heaviness rating scale and asked to provide a verbal rating
of the recalled heaviness of the small and large cubes that
they had lifted in the task (order was counterbalanced across
participants). Participants were instructed that there were no
wrong or right answers and to provide the first answer that
came to mind. The majority of participants (N = 138) were
then asked to lift the cube pair in the same way as they did
during the task (i.e., using precision grip) and to report the
perceived heaviness of each cube, while both were held. The
reported ratings were recorded by the experimenter.

Coding
For both explanation conditions (i.e., gesture and no-gesture
condition), speech was transcribed for subsequent analysis.
In the no-gesture condition, video data were rechecked for
gestures, and none were observed. All gestures in the gesture
condition were coded in the context of concurrent speech,
and three categories of gestures were counted (for examples,
see Fig. 3): (1) deictic gestures (i.e., pointing to an object or
location), (2) gestures representing grasp or move actions
with one hand, and (3) gestures representing grasp or move
actions with two hands. Note that, in the actual task, pairs
of blocks were lifted simultaneously with one block in each
hand. As such, gestures representing grasp or move actions
with two hands most closely resemble the actions used in the
problem task. All 53 videos were coded by one coder (one
author of this paper) whose scores were used in analyses.
Because coding was a time-intensive task, only a subset of
the data (18%) was coded by a second coder (and author
of this paper) to establish reliability. The reliability of the
subset of participants may be generalized to the full sample
(Hallgren, 2012) and this approach is in line with the previous studies using gesture coding (e.g., Chu et al., 2014;
Cook & Goldin-Meadow, 2006). To quantify the agreement
between the two coders, Krippendorff’s alpha (inter-rater
reliability for two coders of a ratio variable) was calculated
for the gesture count of each category separately (using the
SPSS macro of Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). All alphas
were above 0.96.
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Exploratory: gesture kinematics using frame
differencing method
We obtained the rate of movement (velocity) of gestures
using a Frame Differencing Method (FDM; current sampling
rate 25 frames per second). FDM utilizes an algorithm that
computes the number of pixels that change from frame to
frame from a video recording (using Python code made publicly available by Brookshire et al., 2017). This method provides an indication of gross movement through time—and
is reliable compared to the other methods such as Polhemus
or Kinect (see Romero et al., 2017)—which can be used as
an estimate of velocity of hand-gesture movements. We were
interested in the velocity of lifting gestures, specifically, to
see if the kinematics of such gestures during the lifting phase
is related to participants’ estimated heaviness of the cubes.
We (1) computed velocity traces for each participant’s video
data using the FDM method, (2) z-normalized the velocity
traces for each participant, such that individual differences
in body size (and thus pixel change/velocity) are rescaled,
and (3) applied a Butterworth low-pass filter (10 Hz) which
smooths noise-related fluctuations (for data manipulation
procedures, see R script on OSF: https://www.osf.io/9uh6q
/).
Subsequently, an independent rater who was unaware
of the weight judgments given by the participants used the
annotation software ELAN (Lausberg & Sloetjes, 2009) to
identify each two-handed grasping gesture that simulated a
lifting movement of the objects. Two-handed gestures that
did not include a lifting movement were not used for this
analysis.2 Using custom-made script in R, we merged the
ELAN gesture codings with the velocity trace data. We then
used this to identify the velocity trace of the first 500 ms of
each lifting gesture that was produced by each participant.
We focused on this time frame, because physics dictates that,
everything else being equal, heavy objects will have more
inertia (are more resistant to change in motion) as compared

2

Although these two-handed gestures were coded under different
criteria as to isolate lifting movements, this measure significantly correlated (r = .73) with two-handed grasp/move gestures.

Psychological Research

to lighter objects. Thus, if a gesture simulates the inertial
forces of lifting a heavy object, the velocities generated
during the first 500 ms of the lifting gesture will be lower
(i.e., “the movement will be slower”) as compared to gestures simulating manipulations with lighter objects with low
inertia. Indeed, velocity or positive peaks in velocity have
been used to quantify language-induced weight-expectancy
effects for actual lifting movements (e.g., Scorolli, Borghi, &
Glenberg, 2009). Furthermore, (average) velocity for lifting
phases (rather than the reach and placing phases), is one of
the defining perceptual cues that determine whether observers can see whether a light vs. heavy object is being lifted
(Alaerts, Breukelaar, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2012). Thus,
we focused on velocity for the initial lifting phase (500 ms)
of the lifting gesture.
We also computed the combined heaviness rating of the
objects for each participant, which is the average of the
recalled heaviness rating for the small and large objects.
Because we are interested in how weight judgments affect
gesture kinematics, we computed the average gesture velocity trajectory for all participants who reported a particular
heaviness rating. Thus, if six participants judged objects to
have a combined weight of 3, the average velocity trajectory
(500 ms trajectories) was calculated for the gestures of those
participants. Thus, for each observed heaviness rating, we
have a stereotypical (i.e., averaged) gesture velocity trajectory. This way, we can compare how gesture velocity trajectories differ as a function of whether they were produced by
someone with lower or higher weight judgments.

Results
The method and results of this study were pre-registered.
We, first, present the results pertaining to hypotheses and
analyses that were pre-registered. As described, these confirmatory analyses did not support the predictions stated
in the pre-registration. We, thus, conducted several further
analyses to help contextualize and understand these null
findings. Such analyses are labeled as exploratory in the
sections that follow.

Descriptive statistics
In Table 1 in “Appendix 1”, the means, standard deviations,
and correlations are provided for the main variables in this
study.

Planned confirmatory analysis: effect of condition
on recalled heaviness ratings

Fig. 4  Effect of condition on recalled heaviness. Error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals

cube) as a within-subjects factor, and Condition (gesture,
no-gesture, control) as a between-subjects factor. Note that
counterbalanced conditions for the order of heaviness ratings
(small–large or large–small) did not affect overall heaviness
ratings, F(1, 157) = 0.07, p = 0.799, or differences in heaviness ratings, F(1, 157) = 0.036, p = 0.849, and will, therefore, not be adopted in the tested models (as planned in the
pre-registration). Surprisingly, in contrast to the typically
reported size-weight illusion (SWI), participants recalled the
large cube as being heavier (M = 4.71, SD = 1.83) than the
small cube (M = 3.88, SD = 1.82), Size: F(1, 156) = 23.63,
p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13, d = − 0.39. This indicates that there
was an inverted SWI when participants reported the cubes’
heaviness from memory. As can be seen in Fig. 4, there was
no statistically significant effect of Condition on recalled
heaviness, Condition: F(2, 156) = 0.47, p = .627, ηp2 = 0.006.
Finally, the difference in heaviness ratings for small vs. large
cubes did not differ as a function of Condition, Size × Condition: F(2, 156) = 0.11, p = .892, ηp2 = 0.001. This indicates that the SWI was unaffected by whether participants
explained or gestured about the task.

Exploratory analysis 1: evidential value for null
findings
Given the null results for our confirmatory analyses with
regards to condition, we performed an additional exploratory Bayesian analysis to estimate the likelihood of the
observed data given the null hypothesis. All Bayes’ factors
(BF) reported in this manuscript were computed by JASP
(JASP Team 2016, Version 0.8.4), which operates with the
default priors p(M) = 0.5 (Cauchy prior of h = 0.75; Rouder,
Morey, Verhagen, Swagman, & Wagenmakers, 2017). Jeffreys (1961) classifies the strength of effects with respect to

As stated in the pre-registration, we performed a 2 × 3 mixed
ANOVA (including interactions), with Size (small vs. large
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Fig. 5  Effect of condition on perceived heaviness. Error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals

Bayes’ factors (BF)3 as follows: no evidence BF = 1, anecdotal evidence BF = 1–3, substantial evidence BF = 3–10,
strong BF = 10–30, very strong BF = 30–100, and decisive
BF > 100.
We performed a Bayesian 2 × 3 mixed-design ANOVA
(including interactions), with Size (small vs. large cube) as
within-subjects factor and Condition as between-subjects
factor. The Bayesian analysis for the between-subject effect
of Condition yielded BF01 = 12.13 (strong evidence). This
suggests that the null hypothesis, predicting no differences in
heaviness ratings as a function of Condition, is 12.13 times
more likely given the data as compared to a model predicting
differences between groups. The interaction effect of Condition and Size yielded decisive evidence for the null hypothesis (BF01 = 191.09). Note that Bayesian analyses also provided decisive evidence against the null hypothesis for the
within-subjects effect of Size, where we obtained an inverted
SWI (BF10 > 1000). In summary, we obtained strong to decisive evidence that Condition did not affect heaviness ratings
of the small cube vs. large cube when made from memory.

Exploratory analyses of perceived heaviness ratings
Analysis 2a: materials check We did not obtain the typical
SWI when participants recalled heaviness of the cubes from
memory. In fact, participants rated the large cube as heavier
than the small cube when rating heaviness from memory
of their previous experience (an inverted SWI). However,
3
Note that BFs are always reported for the hypothesis that is most
likely given the data. Therefore, BF10 (odds ratio for the alternative
vs. null hypotheses given the data) provides evidence for the alternative hypothesis (supporting significant p values), whereas 
BF01
(odds ratio null/alternative) provides evidence for the null hypothesis
(supporting non-significant p values). Thus, larger BFs always equal
stronger evidence.
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when heaviness was rated while actually holding the objects
at the end of the experiment (i.e., as a direct estimate of
the SWI), the typical SWI appeared as expected, indicating
that the cubes did, indeed, generate a reliable SWI in this
sample. As can be seen in Fig. 5, the small cube (M = 5.32,
SD = 1.61) was perceived as heavier than the large cube
(M = 3.72, SD = 1.37), Size: F(1, 138) = 153.70, p < .001,
BF10 > 1000, d = 1.05.
Analysis 2b: effects of condition We further assessed
whether Condition affected perceived heaviness, while
the cubes were being held. We performed a similar 2 × 3
mixed-design ANOVA (including interactions), with Size
(small vs. large cube) as a within-subjects factor and Condition as a between-subjects factor. There was no statistically
significant effect of Condition, F(2, 156) = 0.07, p = .934,
BF01 = 10.06, ηp2 = 0.001, or Condition × Size interaction,
F(2, 136) = 0.63, p = .535, BF01 = 58.92, ηp2 = 0.009, on
perceived heaviness ratings.

Exploratory analyses of possible covariates
Analysis 3: individual differences in gesture The previous
research has shown that the number of task-relevant gestures
mediated magnitude of the effects on problem-solving performance (Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Wassenburg
et al., 2018). Table 1 (“Appendix 1”) provides a correlation matrix of the number of observed gesture types that
occurred per minute (deictic, one-handed grasp/move, and
two-handed grasp/move) and heaviness ratings of the cubes.
In addition, for the gesture condition, the mean gesture
rate per minute is provided in this table. The most striking result in this correlational analysis was that more twohanded grasp/move gestures were highly correlated with a
smaller difference in recalled heaviness of the two cubes,
β = − 0.37, t(52) = − 2.82, p = .007, BF10 = 6.54. As can be
seen in Fig. 6, the difference was primarily carried by judgments that the larger cube was heavier, r = .29, t(52) = 2.18,
p = .034, BF10 = 2.11, while the numerical judgments for
the recalled heaviness of the smaller cube were unrelated
to the number of two-handed gestures per minute; r = − .15,
t(52) = − 1.08, p = .284, BF10 = 1.90. Note from Table 1 that
there were no significant correlations between other types of
gestures (deictic and one-handed grasp/move gestures) and
difference in heaviness recalled from memory. The significant negative correlation, r = − .28, t(52) = − 2.11, p = .040,
BF10 = 1.67, between the total number of gestures (sum of
deictic, one-handed and two-handed grasp/move gestures,
and all other undefined gestures) and difference in heaviness recalled from memory thus seems to be carried by the
number of two-handed grasp/move gestures. Also note that
there were no significant correlations of gesture with respect
to perceived heaviness, while the objects were in hand.
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Fig. 6  Two-handed gestures and heaviness of the objects, as rated
from memory. Regression slopes and confidence intervals for the
relation between two-handed grasp/move gestures and recalled heaviness ratings for the (differences of) small cube (upper right) and large
cube (lower right). Lower values on the difference scores (left graph)
indicate that the larger cube is rated from memory as heavier than the

smaller cube, leading to negative scores. Note that some participants
(those with positive difference scores) did recall the smaller cube as
heavier than the larger cube, indicating memory of the consciously
experienced illusion. Figures were generated with statistical software
R (R Core Team, 2017). (Color figure online)

Fig. 7  Velocity traces for the two-handed gesture launches and scatter plot for velocity samples as related to heaviness ratings. Left
panel: mean velocity traces (500 ms) for each recalled heaviness rating (blackened lines indicated higher weight estimates; more yellow/
lighter lines indicate lighter recalled heaviness ratings). A steeper
positive slope of the velocity trajectory indicates that a gesture is

moving more quickly; that is, velocity of the movement is increased
in a shorter amount of time (i.e., higher acceleration) as compared
to a more negatively sloped trajectory. Right panel: scatter plot with
regression slope and SE interval (heaviness represented in color to
match left panel) and x-axis. (Color figure online)

Analyses 4 and 5: other individual differences In Analyses
4 and 5, we explored individual differences in practice time,
explanation time, and speech content, to determine whether
these variables may have affected our results. Results showed

that neither practice time nor explanation time was statistically significant when added as covariates to the confirmatory analyses. Furthermore, speech rate and speech content
could not account for the effect of two-handed gestures on
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recalled heaviness. For a more detailed description of the
results, see “Appendix 2”.
Analysis 6: exploratory analyses of gesture kinematics
Figure 7 shows the velocity traces for gesture launch phases
(500 ms) averaged for participants and combined heaviness
rating from memory (min = 2, M = 4.24, max = 7). Participants
who rated objects as heavier (darker black lines) produced gesture launches with lower velocity and acceleration than participants who rated objects as lighter (lines with more yellow
coloring), as indicated by less steep trajectories and earlier
velocity stabilization. This suggests that participants who
recalled objects as heavier gestured about the objects as though
they would be more difficult to lift. A correlation analyses
confirmed that the higher the recalled heaviness of the small
cube and large cube (combined), the lower the velocity values,
r(154) = − 0.29 (~ medium-effect size), p < .001, BF10 = 78.45
(see Fig. 7 right panel for the relation of heaviness and velocity
data). Note that this relationship between velocity and weight
estimates was not present for weight estimates that were made
when objects were held, r(154) = 0.04, p = .52, BF01 = 6.41.

Discussion
The present pre-registered study assessed how gestures support memory for sensorimotor information of the weight of
task-relevant objects during problem solving. The pieces
were designed to induce the visual-haptic size-weight illusion
(SWI), which is a consciously experienced perception that
smaller objects are heavier than larger objects when the two
are actually the same weight. Because gestures have been suggested to affect sensorimotor knowledge (Beilock & GoldinMeadow, 2010; Cooperrider et al., 2015; Goldin-Meadow &
Beilock, 2010; Trofatter et al., 2015), it was predicted that the
magnitude of the SWI would be affected when participants
gestured about the task-relevant objects. On one hand, gestures
could increase the size of the illusion, suggesting that gestures
strengthen, in memory, the consciously perceived illusion
that the pieces differ in weight. On the other hand, gestures
could decrease the size of the illusion, suggesting that gestures
strengthen the implicit sensorimotor knowledge that the pieces
have the same weight. We found no evidence to support the
prediction that gesturing about the problem pieces affected the
weight estimates of the pieces in either direction. Instead, our
results show that judgments about the weight of the cubes were
unaffected by whether participants gestured.
Interestingly, our exploratory analyses revealed that speakers who produced the most gestures mimicking the form of the
two-handed lifting and moving actions involved in the task were
also the most likely to experience a large inverted SWI in their
memory for the pieces. Namely, the number of two-handed
grasp gestures produced per minute by participants who were
told to gesture as they explained the task was reliably associated

13

with their memory of how heavy the pieces were. This finding,
thus, replicates the previous reports that action-relevant gestures are reflective of sensorimotor cognition (e.g., Beilock &
Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Wassenburg et al., 2018). Furthermore,
we provide an additional evidence that the velocity with which
speakers lifted their hands as they gestured is related to their
memory of the objects’ weight. When speakers thought of the
objects as heavy in their memory, they gestured about them as
though they would be more difficult to lift, as indicated by lower
average velocity traces. This provides evidence that speakers
embody weight information in the kinematics of their co-speech
gestures (as predicted by Mangelsdorf, Cooperrider, & GoldinMeadow, 2017; see also Ansuini et al., 2016 for related findings
with pantomimes; see also Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009, for how
gesture kinematics is affected by the previous task experiences).
Future research could specifically focus on how the kinematics of gestures about interactions with objects might be similar to and different from the kinematics of actually interacting
with the objects. Indeed, although gestures might approximate
object-oriented actions in some respects (as shown here), they
are very likely to diverge on the other aspects wherein kinematics are constrained by dynamics that arise by actual wielding of
objects (e.g., Runeson & Frykholm, 1983).
Furthermore, this is the first evidence that gestures reflect
sensorimotor information that is consciously perceived, rather
than the precise kinematics of a previous action. Participants
who believed the objects were heavier gestured about them
with slower lifting velocities than participants who believed
that they were lighter, even though all objects in the present
study were of exactly the same weight and required identical lifting velocities as participants solved the task. This is
interesting, because it suggests that gestures are not direct recreations of the previous actions; rather, they are actions that
are filtered through the participants’ conscious beliefs about
those actions. This finding aligns with claims that gestures are
representational (Novack & Goldin-Meadow, 2017) or simulated (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) actions. Thus, actions and
gestures are critically different, because gestures cannot and
do not attune to action-relevant information in the environment
the way that actual actions on objects do (Laimgruber, Goldenberg, & Hermsdörfer, 2005; Kuntz, Karl, Doan, & Whishaw,
2018; Runeson & Frykholm, 1983), at least not when the
objects are not present (cf. Chu & Kita, 2016). Although gestures may have their origin in the action system, their execution
is affected by the producer’s sensorimotor expectations about
how they would act in the world, rather than by an implicit
memory of how that action was actually produced.
In the current task, it is possible that participants were not
judging the weight of the objects on the basis of attuning to
the previous experience via memory at all. It might be that
no such memory about weight was available, or, otherwise,
explicable. Instead, a rational choice was made on the fly based
on a heuristic that larger/smaller objects are heavier/lighter.
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It is unclear, however, why the use of such a strategy would
be related to how speakers gesture about lifting the pieces.
Instead, we argue that participants were most likely accessing
a haptic knowledge for a simulation for what it felt like to lift
the pieces when they made their weight judgments. Indeed, it
has been found that, when judging an object’s weight, people
actually imagine holding the object rather than using some
kind of propositional rule (Klatzky, Lederman, & Matula,
1991). Furthermore, it has been found that previously experienced haptic information can be attuned to with some success, as haptic memory of objects even allows one to discover
new properties of the object in imagery (Pouw, Aslanidou,
Kamermans, & Paas, 2017; see also Kamermans et al., under
review). Thus, although there is a possibility that participants
only remembered visual properties of the objects and then used
these visual properties to make heuristic inferences about the
objects’ haptic properties, research suggests that this is not how
people tend to judge haptic properties from memory.
We speculate that both gestures and weight estimates in
the current context result from simulations that are neither the
result of a “pure memory” of a previous action, nor the result
of a rule-like “heuristic” that “small/large objects are lighter/
heavier”. Rather, a simulation involves generation of information that abides by regularities observed in the real-world, and
is not the simple replay of a previously performed action. This
is based on the argument that actions are not represented by
some motor plan that incorporates a list of muscle activations
needed to perform the action successfully (Bernstein, 1966).
Indeed, research (e.g., Kelso, Tuller, Vatikiotis-Bateson, &
Fowler, 1984) has shown that when an action is initiated (e.g.,
speaking), perturbation of the trajectory of that action (e.g.,
locking the jaw in place) leads to fluid adjustments which
recruit the other muscles than would, otherwise, be the case
(e.g., lip adjustments), yielding a new sensorimotor solution
to the same goal (e.g., speaking a syllable “|baeb|”). Thus, if
gesture is derived from practical action, it is likely based on the
broader ability to construct sensorimotor solutions constrained
by contextual demands, rather than on memory of sensorimotor particulars. Of course, gestures are far less constrained by
contextual demands than actions, because they do not involve
real objects. This is precisely why gestures may reflect stereotypical sensorimotor solutions—gestures act out actions in ways
that would fit most contexts (e.g., slower lifting gestures for
heavier objects). A simulation is, therefore, a constructive process based on the accumulated sensorimotor knowledge that
“smaller/larger objects are lighter/heavier”, but it goes beyond
a simple heuristic, because it involves knowledge of real-world
sensorimotor contingencies. We suggest that both producing
gestures about interacting with the pieces and imagining the
pieces so as to judge their weight rely on the simulation of
expectations about how it would feel to interact with the pieces.
Importantly, however, in our study, we find no evidence
that gesturing about the pieces in a certain way caused a

change in how participants thought about the weight of the
pieces. Experimentally manipulating gesture did not affect
participants’ recollection or perception of the weights of the
cubes. The fact that no significant differences between conditions were found and speech content did not affect perceived
heaviness indicates that it is unlikely that our choice of conditions impacted our results. Instead, we observed an effect
within the gesture condition—a correlation between how
participants thought about the cubes and how they gestured
about them. Participants’ utilization of two-handed gestures
was related to the magnitude of the SWI they experienced,
and the velocity with which they gestured was related to their
recalled heaviness of the cubes. We speculate that, in both
cases, how people thought about the task as they described
it was reflected in gesture. Participants may have imagined
the motor kinematics of the task to a greater or lesser degree
as they were explaining the problem. Those more inclined
to simulate the specifics of interacting with the cubes were
more likely to produce two-handed gestures that showed the
specific action required to manipulate the cubes, including
the relative velocity of lifting light/heavy objects. Furthermore, participants who thought more specifically about the
motor processes involved in the task as they were describing
were also likely to form a weight judgment that was based on
a sensorimotor judgment when asked to judge the objects’
weight. Such detailed sensorimotor imagination of the cubes
(both during the description task and during the rating task)
was particularly likely to be distorted by the sensorimotor
know-how that large objects are generally heavy. Under this
explanation, two-handed lifting gestures were an embodiment of detailed sensorimotor imagery about lifting, but
were not a driving agent in whether participants adopted a
detailed sensorimotor imagining or not.
An interesting aspect of this finding is how the judgments
were biased when they were made from memory. In the classic
SWI, participants judge a smaller cube that they are holding as
heavier than a larger cube when the two are actually the same
weight. Although we replicated this traditional SWI when the
cubes were compared from immediate experience (the smaller
cube was perceived as 43% heavier than the larger cube), when
participants were asked to judge the heaviness of the cubes from
memory, they seemed to judge heaviness rationally—that is,
they reported that the larger cube had felt 21% heavier than the
smaller cube.4 This effect was not predicted, and to our knowledge, this is the first study that has revealed an inverted SWI
when weight judgments are made from memory (as the SWI
is generally not studied in relation to the memory system). The
previous research has indicated that people actually imagine
4

Note, however, that the inversion is not complete as it seems to be
half the size of the original size-weight illusion, 21% versus 43% difference. Also, some participants did perceive the smaller object as
heavier based on memory reducing the inverted size-weight illusion
on the group level.
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holding an object when judging the object’s weight and other
haptic properties (Klatzky et al., 1991), yet the observed inversion of the SWI in memory suggests that this active imagining
is not operating with accurate implicit memories of how these
particular objects were perceived as they were manipulated
(which would have led to no illusion) or with accurate explicit
memories of how these particular objects were perceived as
they were manipulated (which would have led to the traditional
smaller-is-heavier illusion). Instead, the judgment seems to be
based on a stereotypical understanding that larger objects are
typically heavier than smaller objects.
One of the reviewers of the current paper suggested that there
is a possibility that the memory of sensorimotor experiences
may be affected by sensorimotor expectations. Under this view,
it is not so much that participants are drawing from a memory of
a sensorimotor experience (e.g., small object being heavy), but
rather from a transformed memory where unexpected aspects
of the sensorimotor event (e.g., light objects feeling heavier)
are “washed out”. The degree to which a memory is resolved in
favor of a sensorimotor expectancy might then explain why gesture is related to heaviness ratings from memory. The task-relevant two-handed gesturing effectively is related to expectancy,
not so much a memory. We are very favourable to this idea as we
have argued that gestures are governed by a system that operates
on a history of sensorimotor contingencies, rather than on the
sensorimotor specifics of a moment ago, though the scope of
the current results deems this idea still too speculative, and more
research is needed to directly test this idea. Note that research on
the SWI has confirmed that repeated interactions with objects
can affect the illusion, suggesting that the sensorimotor history
can be manipulated and is not some unchangeable pre-given.
Namely, Flanagan, Bittner, and Johansson (2008) have found
that after a multi-day training with interacting with objects that
induce the SWI (240 lifts for 11 days), the SWI not only dissipates, it is inverted. Extensively trained participants judged
larger objects as heavier than smaller objects that weighed the
same. If gestures are indeed based on expectations that operate
on slow timescales, we would expect that multi-day training with
new sensorimotor contingencies would be (especially) apparent in the way that people gesture about such contingencies.
Further research can explore our hypothesis that gestures attune
to a history of sensorimotor interactions by assessing effects of
multi-day training vs. immediate previous experiences when we
gesture about object manipulations. Furthermore, perhaps, in
the current paradigm, repeated sensorimotor imagining of the
objects in gesture may come to affect sensorimotor expectations
given enough time (Pouw & Hostetter, 2016).
To conclude, the present pre-registered study has offered
novel insights into how gestures are related to memory of
sensorimotor information. Although gesturing about the
cubes did not affect participants’ memories of how heavy the
objects were or their judgments of perceived heaviness when
the objects were held again, the kinematics of gestures were
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related to speakers’ thinking about sensorimotor properties of
the cubes. The results indicate that gestures reflect rather than
affect the way that we think about and remember objects’ sensorimotor properties, at least in the context examined here. It
appears that gestures do not just reveal information about the
actions which a speaker performed; instead, they reveal how
the speaker thinks about what they did.
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Analysis 4: individual differences in practice time We
assessed whether differences in time spent practicing the
task differed per condition. An ANOVA revealed that
this was not the case (F < 1, BF’s01 = 6.82). Furthermore,
there were small differences in the amount of time allotted (SD = 7.77 s) to explain the task, as one experimenter
stopped the stopwatch when participants started to explain
the rules of the task instead of the procedure of the task.
This did not lead to significant differences in explanation
time between the no-gesture vs. gesture condition, (F < 1,
BF’s01 = 6.32). Neither practice time nor explanation time
was statistically significant when added as covariates to
the previous confirmatory analyses for the effect of Condition on heaviness ratings (Fs < 1, BF’s01 > 3.46).
Analysis 5: individual differences in speech and its relation with gesture Although none of the participants in the
explanation conditions (no-gesture and gesture condition)
mentioned weight or heaviness during their explanations,
nine participants mentioned size at least once. Of these,
four were in the no-gesture condition, and five were in
the gesture condition (mean number of mentions of size:
no-gesture condition = 0.17, SD = 0.67, gesture condition = 0.45, SD = 1.61, t[104] = 1.18 p = .241, BF01 = 2.62,
d = 0.23). In general, participants in the no-gesture condition spoke 97.00 (SD = 26.19) words per minute, as compared to 110.39 (SD = 22.90) words per minute for participants in the gesture condition. This difference in speech
rate was statistically significant, t(104) = 2.80, p = .006,
BF10 = 6.370, d = 0.54.
We further assessed relations between spoken words
per minute, the number of mentions of weights and size,
and gesture frequencies per minute (see also Table 1 in
“Appendix 1”). First, there was a statistically significant
positive correlation between number of words spoken and
the total number of gestures (p < .001, B F 10 = 120.135)
and deictic gestures (p = .002, B F 10 = 16.35). However,
the number of words spoken did not significantly correlate with two-handed gestures (p = .176, BF01 = 5.69) or
one-handed gestures (p = .264, BF01 = 1.45). No significant
correlations were found for the number of mentions of size
of the cubes and gesture frequencies.
Although the number of words spoken did not seem
related to two-handed gestures, it did relate in a similar
way to the inverted SWI. Namely, just as two-handed gestures were related to a larger inverted SWI from memory,
higher speech rates also related to a larger inverted SWI,
β = − 0.21, t(105) = − 2.21, p = .029, BF10 = 1.787. However, when both number of words and number of twohanded gestures per minute were entered in a single analysis (with participants from the gesture condition), only
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number of two-handed gestures was a significant predictor of the size of the illusion, R2 = 0.15, F(2, 25) = 4.33,
p = .018; β words = − 0.11, t(52) = − 0.86, p = .396;
βtwo-handed gestures = − 0.37, t(52) = − 2.84, p = .006. The predictive value of a model with only two-handed gestures
as predictor ( BF10 = 6.544) was better than a model with
only speech ( BF10 = 0.341) or with speech and two-handed
gesture (BF10 = 2.840). Taken together, these results suggest that speech rate cannot account for the effect of twohanded gestures on recalled heaviness.
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